

IBM Software Group

Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rational AppScan

An IBM Proof of Technology

N N N S

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Agenda

Introductions & facilities


- Security Landscape
- Vulnerability Analysis
 - Top Attacks Overview
 - Hands on Lab 1
- Vulnerability Analysis (continued)
 - Hands on Lab 2
- Automated Vulnerability Analysis
 - ▶ IBM[®] Rational[®] AppScan Overview
 - Hands on Lab 3





Welcome to the Technical Exploration Center

- Introductions
- Access restrictions
- Restrooms
- Emergency Exits
- Smoking Policy
- Breakfast/Lunch/Snacks location and times
- Special meal requirements?







POT Objectives


By the end of this session you will:

- Understand the Web application environment
- Understand and differentiate between network and application level vulnerabilities
- Understand where the vulnerabilities exist
- Understand how to leverage AppScan to perform an automated scan for vulnerabilities



Introductions

- Please introduce yourself
- Name and organization
- Current integration technologies/tools in use



What do you want out of this Exploration session?

Discovering the Value of Web Application Security Testing with IBM Rational AppScan

Agenda

- Introductions & facilities
- Security Landscape
- Vulnerability Analysis
 - Top Attacks Overview
 - Cross Site Scripting
 - Hands on Lab 1
- Vulnerability Analysis (continued)
 - Hands on Lab 2
- Automated Vulnerability Analysis
 - AppScan Overview
 - Hands on Lab 3





The Alarming Truth

"Approximately 100 million Americans have been informed that they have suffered a security breach so this problem has reached epidemic proportions."

Jon Oltsik – Enterprise Strategy Group

"Up to 21,000 loan clients may have had data exposed"

Marcella Bombardieri, Globe Staff/August 24, 2006

"Personal information stolen from 2.2 million active-duty members of the military, the government said..."

New York Times/June 7, 2006

"Hacker may have stolen personal identifiable information for 26,000 employees.."

ComputerWorld, June 22, 2006



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Why Application Security is a High Priority

Web applications are the #1 focus of hackers:

- 75% of attacks at Application layer (Gartner®)
- XSS and SQL Injection are #1 and #2 reported vulnerabilities (Mitre®)

Most sites are vulnerable:

- > 90% of sites are vulnerable to application attacks (Watchfire®)
- ▶ 78% percent of easily exploitable vulnerabilities affected Web applications (Symantec[™])
- ▶ 80% of organizations will experience an application security incident by 2010 (Gartner)

Web applications are high value targets for hackers:

Customer data, credit cards, ID theft, fraud, site defacement, etc


Compliance requirements:

Payment Card Industry (PCI) Standards, GLBA, HIPPA, FISMA,

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Building Security & Compliance into the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)




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High Level Web Application Architecture Review








Network Defenses for Web Applications

Security



Agenda

- Introductions & facilities
- Security Landscape

• Vulnerability Analysis

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
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Where are the Vulnerabilities?

Security



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The Myth: "Our Site Is Safe"

Security

We Have Firewalls in Place



We Use Network Vulnerability Scanners


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Discovering the Value of Web Application Security Testing with IBM Rational AppScan





The Reality: Security and Spending Are Unbalanced



75% of All Attacks on Information Security Are Directed to the Web Application Layer

2/**3** of All Web Applications Are Vulnerable


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Discovering the Value of Web Application Security Testing with IBM Rational AppScan

Gartner



What is a Web Application?



Input and Output flow through each layer of the application

A break in any layer breaks the whole application

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Security Defects: Those I manage vs. Those I own

	Infrastructure Vulnerabilities or Common Web Vulnerabilities (CWVs)	Application Specific Vulnerabilities (ASVs)
Cause of Defect	Insecure application development by 3rd party SW	Insecure application development In- house
Location within Application	3 rd party technical building blocks or infrastructure (Web servers,)	Business logic - dynamic data consumed by an application
Type(s) of Exploits	Known vulnerabilities (patches issued), misconfiguration	SQL injection, path tampering, Cross site scripting, Suspect content & cookie poisoning
Detection	Match signatures & check for known misconfigurations.	Requires application specific knowledge
Business Risk	Patch latency primary issue	Requires automatic application lifecycle security
Cost Control	As secure as 3 rd party software	Early detection saves \$\$\$



Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) and the OWASP Top 10 list

- Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) an open organization dedicated to fight insecure software
- "The OWASP Top Ten document represents a broad consensus about what the most critical Web application security flaws are"
- We will use the Top 10 list to cover some of the most common security issues in Web applications



The OWASP Top 10 list

Application Threat	Negative Impact	Example Impact
Cross-Site [®] scripting	Identity Theft, Sensitive Information Leakage,	Hackers can impersonate legitimate users, and control their accounts.
Injection Flaws	Attacker can manipulate queries to the DB / LDAP / Other system	Hackers can access backend database information, alter it or steal it.
Malicious File Execution	Execute shell commands on server, up to full control	Site modified to transfer all interactions to the hacker.
Insecure Direct Object Reference	Attacker can access sensitive files and resources	Web application returns contents of sensitive file (instead of harmless one)
Cross-Site Request Forgery	Attacker can invoke "blind" actions on Web applications, impersonating as a trusted user	Blind requests to bank account transfer money to hacker
Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling	Attackers can gain detailed system information	Malicious system reconnaissance may assist in developing further attacks
Broken Authentication & Session Management	Session tokens not guarded or invalidated properly	Hacker can "force" session token on victim; session tokens can be stolen after logout
Insecure Cryptographic Storage	Weak encryption techniques may lead to broken encryption	Confidential information (SSN, Credit Cards) can be decrypted by malicious users
Insecure Communications	Sensitive info sent unencrypted over insecure channel	Unencrypted credentials "sniffed" and used by hacker to impersonate user
Failure to Restrict URL Access	Hacker can access unauthorized resources	Hacker can forcefully browse and access a page past the login page



1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- What is it?
 - Malicious script echoed back into HTML returned from a trusted site, and runs under trusted context
- What are the implications?
 - Session Tokens stolen (browser security circumvented)
 - Complete page content compromised
 - Future pages in browser compromised





Demonstration – Cross Site Scripting

- Main points covered in the demo:
 - Locating an a place where user input which is echoed back to the browser
 - Seeing if the user input is echoed back 'as-is' or if it is properly encoded
 - Exploiting the vulnerability



XSS Example I

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
File

XSS Example II

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		nd for the query: Content_Main_lblSearch"> <script></td><td><mark>alert</mark>(document.cooki</td><td>.e)</script>		
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Cross-Site Scripting – The Exploit Process



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Lab 1 Profile Web Application and XSS

- The Goal of this lab is to:
 - profile the demo.testfire.net application
 - utilize a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability on the demo.testfire.net application in order to access cookies on a target user's browser



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Vulnerability Analysis (continued)

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2 - Injection Flaws

- What is it?
 - ▶ User-supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command, query or data.
- What are the implications?
 - SQL Injection Access/modify data in DB
 - SSI Injection Execute commands on server and access sensitive data
 - LDAP Injection Bypass authentication

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SQL Injection

• User input inserted into SQL Command:

- Get product details by id: Select * from products where id='\$REQUEST["id"]';
- Hack: send param id with value ' or '1'='1
- Resulting executed SQL: Select * from products where id='' or '1'='1'
- All products returned



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Demonstration – SQL Injection


- Main points covered in the demo or video:
 - How to find a SQL injection vulnerability
 - How to exploit a SQL injection vulnerability



SQL Injection Example I

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rivacy Policy Security Statem	ent © 2007 Altoro M	Autual, Inc.		
The Altoro Mutual website is put	olished by Watchfire, Inc	. for the sole purpose of dem	onstrating the effectiveness o	f Watchfire

SQL Injection Example II



SQL Injection Example - Exploit

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Privacy Policy Security Stater	Tient 1 6 2007 Altoro	Motoal, The		

SQL Injection Example - Outcome

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
WANT TO • <u>View Account</u> <u>Summary</u> • <u>View Recent</u> <u>Transactions</u> • <u>Transfer</u> <u>Funds</u> • <u>Search News</u> <u>Articles</u> • <u>Customize</u> <u>Site Language</u>	Hello, John S Welcome to Altoro Mutur View Account Details: Congratulations! You have been pre-app Click <u>Here</u> to apply.	al Online. 1001160140 Checkir	
he Altoro Mutual web n detecting web appli roducts and/or webs Vatchfire does not as http://www.watchfire.c	osite is published by Watchfire, ication vulnerabilities and websi ites are purely coincidental. This	te defects. This site is not a real ban s site is provided "as is" without warra ur use of this website. For additional	trating the effectiveness of Watchfire product iking site. Similarities, if any, to third party anty of any kind, either express or implied. Terms of Use, please go to

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Injection Flaws (SSI Injection Example) Creating commands from input

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Elle Edit View Go Communicator Help	
	N
So to: http://www.123.com/maps.html	· What's Related
🔗 Instant Message 🖳 Members 🖳 WebMail 🖳 Connections 🖳 BizJournal 🕮 SmartUpdate 🖳 Mktplace	
Maps New I	Location
Map a New Address Driving Directions	
Street Address, Intersection or Amport Code	
<pre><!--#exec cat /etc/ssl/private.pem-</pre--></pre>	
City, J. 2 in or a ZIP	
Get Map	
the second second second second second second second second	
#exec cat /etc/ssl/private.pem-</td <td></td>	
	40
P Document: Done	

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The return is the private SSL key of the server

CON

💥 Netscape			
<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> ommunicator <u>H</u> elp			
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A		Stop	
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	<pre><!--#exec /bin/cat /et City, State Zip or a ZIP Get Map</pre--></pre>		
Document: Done			

3 - Malicious File Execution

- What is it?
 - > Application tricked into executing commands or creating files on server
- What are the implications?
 - Command execution on server complete takeover
 - Site Defacement, including XSS option


Malicious File Execution – Example I

G . Google - 🅪 - 🥑 http://www.testfire.net/feedback.aspx 63 v × ONLY ONLINE DRO MUTUAL × BANKING LOGIN Tamper Popup http://www.testfire.net/comment.aspx PERSONAL Request Header Name Request Header Value Post Parameter Name Post Parameter Value Deposit www.testfire.net cfile comments.txt Host Product User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Window name asdf Checking asdf Loan Accept text/xml,application/xml,applicat email addr Products asdf Accept-Language en-us,en;q=0.5 subject Cards asdf Accept-Encoding azip.deflate comments Investments Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1,utf-8;g=0.7,*;g=0. submit +Submit+ & Insurance Keep-Alive 300 · Other Services keep-alive Connection Referer http://www.testfire.net/feedbac SMALL BUSINESS Cookie ASP.NET_SessionId=adp4vz550 Deposit Products Lending Services Cards Insurance Retirement Other Services INSIDE ALTORO OK Cancel MUTUAL About Us Contact Us Clear Form Submit Locations Investor Palation > <

Malicious File Execution – Example cont.

Tamper Popup

/ http://www.testfire.net/comment.aspx





Malicious File Execution – Example cont.

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asdf, asdf, asdf, # Copyright (c) 1993-1999 Microsoft Corp. # # This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows. # # This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each # entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should # be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name. # The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one # space. # # Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual # lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol. # # For example: # # 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server # 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host 127.0.0.1 localhost



4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

- What is it?
 - > Part or all of a resource (file, table, etc.) name controlled by user input.
- What are the implications?
 - Access to sensitive resources
 - Information Leakage, aids future hacks





Insecure Direct Object Reference - Example





Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.

AltoroMu		ign In Contact Us Feedback S	Go DEMO SITE ONLY
ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
PERSONAL	Error! File must be of type	tot or htm	

Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.

Altoro Mu	tual	Sign In Contact Us Feedback	Search DEM SIT ONL	E
ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	
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Other Services ALL BUSINESS Deposit Products Lending Services Cards Insurance Retirement Other Services				
Other Services ALL BUSINESS Deposit Products Lending Services Cards Insurance Retirement				

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5 - Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

- What is it?
 - Unneeded information made available via errors or other means.
- What are the implications?
 - Sensitive data exposed
 - > Web App internals and logic exposed (source code, SQL syntax, exception call stacks, etc.)
 - Information aids in further hacks




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Information Leakage - Example

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SIDE ALTORO MUTUAL • About Us • Contact Us • Locations • Investor Relations	_	g Login atest admin login, please c 0 ctl0 Content Main messag	_	5-6159

Improper Error Handling - Example



Information Leakage – Different User/Pass Error

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL		SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUA
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Investments & Insurance Other Services	Username; Password:	jsmith		
SMALL BUSINESS		Login		

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL		SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUA
PERSONAL • Deposit Product • Checking • Loan Products • Cards • Cards • Investments & Insurance • Other Services SMALL BUSINESS • Deposit Products	Construction and the second	Banking ailed - Inva nouser	g Login lid Username	



6 - Failure to Restrict URL Access

• What is it?

- Resources that should only be available to authorized users can be accessed by forcefully browsing them
- What are the implications?
 - Sensitive information leaked/modified
 - Admin privileges made available to hacker





Failure to Restrict URL Access - Admin User login

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS
PERSONAL • Deposit Product • Checking	Online Ba	anking Login
Loan Products Cards Investments & Insurance Other Services	Password: **	min *** ogin
	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS
I WANT TO • <u>View Account Summ</u> • <u>View Recent</u> <u>Transactions</u> • <u>Transfer Funds</u> • <u>Search News Articles</u> • <u>Customize Site</u> <u>Language</u>	Welcome to A	dmin User Itoro Mutual Online. atails: GO
ADMINISTRATION • <u>View Application Val</u> • <u>Edit Users</u>		dmin/admin.aspx

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Simple user logs in, forcefully browses to admin page

	ONLINE BANKING LOGIN	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	
	PERSONAL • Deposit Product • Checking • Loan Products • Cards • Investments & Insurance • Other Services	Online Bankin Username: Password: Login	g Login	
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Altor	oMutual	Sign Off Contact Us Fee	back Search	DEI SI
				ON:
MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE A	LTORO MUTUAL
I WANT TO • <u>View</u> <u>Application</u> <u>Values</u> • <u>Edit Users</u>	Add an account to a	n existing user. Account Types: Savings		Add Account

Failure to Restrict URL Access: Privilege Escalation Types

- Access given to completely restricted resources
 - Accessing files that shouldn't be served (*.bak, "Copy Of", *.inc, *.cs, ws_ftp.log, etc.)
- Vertical Privilege Escalation
 - Unknown user accessing pages past login page
 - Simple user accessing admin pages
- Horizontal Privilege Escalation
 - User accessing other user's pages
 - Example: Bank account user accessing another's



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Lab 2

Lab 1 – Profile Web Application, Steal Cookies

Lab 2 – Login without Credentials, Steal Usernames and Passwords, Logging into the Administrative Portal

Lab 3 – Automated Scan of Website







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
Automated Vulnerability Analysis

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Watchfire in the Rational Portfolio




AppScan

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- What is it?
 - AppScan is an automated tool used to perform vulnerability assessments on Web Applications
- Why do I need it?
 - To simplify finding and fixing Web application security problems
- What does it do?
 - Scans Web applications, finds security issues and reports on them in an actionable fashion
- Who uses it?
 - Security Auditors main users today
 - QA engineers when the auditors become the bottle neck
 - Developers to find issues as early as possible (most efficient)

IBM Rational AppScan Ecosystem




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Discovering the Value of Web Application Security Testing with IBM Rational AppScan



What does AppScan test for?






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How does AppScan work?

- Approaches an application as a black-box
- Traverses a Web application and builds the site model
- Determines the attack vectors based on the selected Test policy
- Tests by sending modified HTTP requests to the application and examining the HTTP response according to validate rules




Web Application

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
AppScan Goes Beyond Pointing out Problems








Actionable Fix Recommendations





AppScan with QA Defect Logger for ClearQuest





Lab 3 overview

 The goal of this lab is to use AppScan in order to automate the detection of vulnerabilities within a Web application





Session summary

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Session summary

- Understand the Web application environment
- Understand and differentiate between network and application level vulnerabilities
- Understand where the vulnerabilities exist
- Hands on exercises to understand types of vulnerabilities
- Hands on exercise to leverage automated scan for vulnerabilities





Questions

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Discovering the Value of Web Application Security Testing with IBM Rational AppScan

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Next steps

• We can schedule a Vulnerability Assessment of one our your Applications -

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Reference materials

IBM.com

http://www-306.ibm.com/software/rational/welcome/watchfire/products.html

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