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Managing Complex Systems Engineering – A Nuclear Perspective

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IBM Rational



Agenda for Today

Issues facing the Nuclear Industry

Lessons learned and customer examples

Summary



Nuclear power projects are complex and sensitive to cost and schedule but have a history of large cost/ schedule over-runs

| Factor | Sensitivity | Lifecycle average cost/kWh (relative to base case) |
|--|--------------------------|---|
| Construction cost | 25% under budget | 81% |
| | 10% under budget | 92% |
| | 25% over budget | 120% |
| | 50% over budget | 139% |
| Construction timeline | 1 year under plan | 94% |
| | 1 year over plan | 109% |
| | 2 years over plan | 116% |
| Time to ramp up to steady-state service factor | 1 year earlier than plan | 98% |
| | 1 year later than plan | 103% |
| | 2 years later than plan | 107% |

Figure 3: Impact of Key Construction and Start-up Variables on Nuclear Power Economics⁸

“From this model we see that total construction cost is arguably *the key factor*, and that even a modest cost over-run (10-15%) could erase the cost advantage over competing fuel sources that a business case would have indicated.”

Cost over runs continue to climb

| Site/Supplier | Timeline | | Budget | | Reasons cited |
|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|----------|-----------|--|
| | Original | Current | Original | Current | |
| Olkiluoto, Finland (new) Areva | 2009 | 2012 | €3 Bn | €4.5 Bn | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unrealistic forecast (5 years) New technology (EPR) Contractor experience Execution flaws (e.g., welds, coolant pipes) Lack of capable resources |
| Chernobyl, Ukraine (refurb) AECL | 2001/02 | 2003/04 | \$1.1B | \$3 – 4 B | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project management capability Complexity |
| Lungmen, Taiwan (new) GE | 2009/10 | 2011/12 | \$6.8B | \$7.9B | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Component delivery / installation Political factors (approvals) |

Figure 4: Nuclear Project Cost / Schedule Over-run Examples

* Source: Power Gen 2010: 'CAN UTILITIES DELIVER NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON-TIME AND ON-BUDGET?'
 Authors: Kish Khemani and Neal Walters with AT KEARNEY.



Operational plants are facing increasing regulatory challenges

- Compliance efforts are manually-intensive and time consuming
- Cost of outages can run into millions of \$US per day

NRC To Investigate Safety Valve Incident At Shearon Harris Plant.

The [Raleigh \(NC\) News & Observer](#) (5/7, Murawski) reports, "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a special inspection to figure out why a pair of safety valves failed to close last month at the Shearon Harris nuclear plant when the reactor was shut down for refueling." Four "NRC inspectors will spend the week reviewing the incident."

Lawmaker: San Onofre won't restart until safety operations are assured:

Southern California Edison officials won't restart the San Onofre nuclear plant in California until the safe operation of the plant is assured, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., said after touring the facility. The plant has been offline since January because of steam-generator problems. "We all have families near the plant, so they're not going ... to do anything that puts the public at risk," Rohrabacher said.

[in Jose Mercury News \(Calif.\)/City News Service](#) (free registration) (5/4)

NRC: Concrete concern is an issue for N.H. plant relicensing

NextEra Energy's bid to extend the operating license of its Seabrook nuclear plant in New Hampshire hinges on the company's handling of concrete degradation at the facility, said Chris Miller, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's director of reactor safety. The company needs to pinpoint the cause of the concrete degradation and establish a corrective action plan.

Dominion shareholders defeat safety-review plan

Dominion Resources' shareholders defeated New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo's proposal for the company to reassess its nuclear-safety practices. More than 2 million shares in the company, said that last year, the East Coast prompted the shutdown of the company's North Anna plant in Virginia, and federal regulators later determined that the incident was not a safety issue.

Swiss nuclear plants clear EU-ordered stress tests

All of Switzerland's nuclear plants have passed European Union-mandated stress tests for such facilities. The plants had shown "high safety margins and strong robustness" and "no significant safety concerns."

Japan nuclear plant is susceptible to accident, official says

Chubu Electric Power's idled Hamaoka nuclear plant in Shizuoka, Japan is at risk of a major nuclear accident, said Shizuoka Gov. Heita Kawakatsu. Chubu Electric's safety measures for the plant are "inadequate," Kawakatsu said, adding that he will not permit its restart until the utility resolves the used-fuel-disposal issue.

[The Wall Street Journal/Dow Jones Newswires](#) (4/25)

The screenshot shows the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website. The header includes navigation links like HOME, FAQ, GLOSSARY, FACILITY LOCATOR, WHAT'S NEW, SITE HELP, INDEX A-Z, CONTACT US, BROWSE ALOUD, and EMAIL UPDATES. The main navigation bar lists categories: NUCLEAR REACTORS, NUCLEAR MATERIALS, RADIOACTIVE WASTE, NUCLEAR SECURITY, PUBLIC MEETINGS & INVOLVEMENT, NRC LIBRARY, and ABOUT NRC. A search bar is present with the text "Enter your search" and a "SEARCH" button. A yellow button labeled "REPORT A SAFETY CONCERN" is also visible. The main content area features a breadcrumb trail: Home > About NRC > How We Regulate > Research Activities > Digital I&C > Key Issues > Cyber Security. The article title is "Cyber Security in Digital Instrumentation and Controls". Below the title, it says "On this page" followed by a list of links: Background, 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks", Regulatory Guide 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities", Regulatory Guide 1.152, Rev. 3, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants", and Cooperative Agreements and Research. There are also small images of a person in a hard hat and a nuclear reactor dome.



The tight coupling and complex interactions in nuclear plants makes them prone to “systems risk”




Figure 9. Systems that must manage complex interactions and high coupling are more prone to accidents. Space missions are among these high-risk systems.

The growth in complexity leads to growth in risk.

Operators need to take a systematic approach to managing the risk.

Source: *Final Report: NASA Study on Flight Software Complexity*, Commissioned by the NASA Office of Chief Engineer, Technical Excellence Program, Adam West, Program Manager (2009)



Combination and permutation formula illustrates the complexity

$$\frac{n!}{r!(n-r)!} = \binom{n}{r}$$

where **n** is the number of things to choose from, and you choose **r** of them
 (No repetition, order doesn't matter)

$$\frac{n!}{(n-r)!}$$

where **n** is the number of things to choose from, and you choose **r** of them
 (No repetition, order matters)

| | | |
|--|-------------|---|
| | | |
| | Combination | |
| | | 242519269720337000000000 |
| | | 2.E+23 |
| | Permutation | |
| | | 3761767332187390000000000000000000000000000000000 |
| | | 4.E+48 |
| | 100 n | |
| | 25 r | |



Additional challenges are being driven by the transition to digital Instrumentation and Controls (I&C)

Diversity and defense-in-depth and protection against common-cause failures

Self-diagnostics within a digital I&C platform

Communications between safety and non-safety channels

Highly-integrated control rooms

Qualification of safety system platforms

Software verification and validation (V&V)

Software quality

Cyber security


Configuration management

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for digital systems




10 of the top issues to avoid as energy systems modernize throughout the life cycle.

- 1. Requirements grow and change at rates in excess of 1 percent per calendar month.**
2. Few applications include greater than 80 percent of user requirements in the first release.
3. Some requirements are dangerous or “toxic” and should not be included.
4. Some applications are overstuffed with extraneous features no one asked for.
5. Most software applications are riddled with security vulnerabilities.
- 6. Errors in requirements and design cause many high-severity bugs.**
7. Effective methods such as requirement and design inspections are seldom used.
8. Standard, reusable requirements and designs are not widely available.
9. Mining legacy applications for “lost” business requirements seldom occurs.
- 10. The volume of paper documents may be too large for human understanding.**



We have seen value in implementing a better collaboration platform across the ecosystem




Change in one area ripples across the other areas

All participants must be synchronized during the plant's life, from conception to decommissioning




Effective, comprehensive, and well-integrated requirements management is often chosen as a place to start



The relationships become difficult to manage as well as the change - a solid and integrated platform is needed



Effective requirements management is a foundational element that needs to be addressed from project conception



Text-based approaches introduce risk into the system and project but that is the norm today.

| Method | Requirements Completeness | Requirements Defects per Function Point |
|---|---------------------------|---|
| Dynamic Modeling | 97% | 0.10 |
| Quality Functional Deployment | 96% | 0.25 |
| Requirements Inspections | 95% | 0.10 |
| Use Cases | 80% | 0.80 |
| Energy Legacy Applications | 70% | 0.20 |
| Prototyping | 62% | 0.55 |
| Information Requirements Gathering | 57% | 1.00 |
| Normal Text Documents | 50% | 1.10 |

Advanced step


Interim step

Standard procedure today

Requirements Methods (Capers 2010)



Nuclear customers are moving forward with this approach



A REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL REPOSITORY



Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB

Lena Morén and Åsa Olson, SKB

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, Box 250 SE-101 24 Stockholm

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The operation and construction of a final repository facility and repository for spent nuclear fuel is regulated in Swedish laws. To support the development of a repository design in conformity to the regulations SKB has developed a requirements management system (RMS). The RMS shall make the basis and motive for the design traceable, facilitate system development, understanding and decision making.

In the RMS the requirements and other design premises are organized in a hierarchy. Each level in the hierarchy can be regarded as a specification. The highest level specifies the problem to be solved and the principles to be applied in the design, and the lowest level the design of individual components.

The higher level requirements are based on laws and regulations and generally accepted safety and radiation protection principles. The lower level design premises are based on results from the assessments of the operational and long-term safety and technology development. The formulation of concise requirement texts requires both system understanding and, since the requirements constitute specifications, choice of design alternative. The development initiates cooperation between groups and supports system understanding.





Kärnbränslehantering AB

Design premises

Level 1: Stakeholder requirements

Requirements expressing basic requirements and principles for the design.

Sources and level of detail

Laws and regulations
 Stakeholder demands

Problem to be solved and principles to be applied in the design

Example

The post-closure safety of the final repository shall be based on several barrier functions that are maintained through a system of passive barriers.

Levels 2 and 3: System and sub-system requirements

Requirements expressing the functions the repository and repository facility shall have to conform to the objectives and principles.

Laws and regulations
 The KBS-3 method
 The spent nuclear fuel

The KBS-3 repository and repository facility

The final repository shall contain the spent nuclear fuel and isolate it from the environment at the surface.

Requirements expressing the functions the barriers and technical systems shall have for the repository and facility to maintain their functions.

Laws and regulations
 The KBS-3 method
 The spent nuclear fuel

The engineered and natural barriers
 The technical systems

The canister shall sustain the containment and withstand the mechanical loads that are expected to occur in the final repository.

Levels 4 and 5: Design requirements and reference design

Requirements expressing the properties and parameters to be designed and the terms they shall fulfil.

The required functions and results from the safety assessment, research and development

The compression yield strength and the dimensions of the insert shall be such that the copper shell remains tight with respect to the largest expected isostatic load.

Other premises for the design

Premises for the design from:
 - the safety assessment,
 - the other barriers,
 - the production and operation

The components of the engineered barriers and their properties
 The layout and properties of the underground openings
 The components of the technical systems

Largest isostatic load 45 MPa
 = max. swelling pressure +
 max. groundwater pressure.

Figure 1 The hierarchy of design premises in SKB's RMS with an example.






Figure 1. SKB's version of the V-model with the requirement hierarchy, the constraints, the specified issues and the verification. The black arrows illustrates links in the RMS. For the verification lighter colour illustrate design phases and darker construction and operation phases.






VAHA

Requirements Management System for the Final Disposal of the Spent Fuel

May 10, 2012

Posiva Oy

Juhani Palmu



POSIVA

Juhani Palmu



VAHA Project - the requirements related to the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland



VAHA Project

- VAHA – vaatimustenhallinta – requirements management
- The aim of the project is to design and implement a systematic process and an information system to manage **the requirements related to the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel** in Finland.



VAHA Project, System Structure

Level 1 - Stakeholder requirements

Level 2 - System requirements

Level 3 - Sub-system requirements


Level 4 - Design requirements

Level 5 - Design specifications

Constraints




VAHA Project, System Structure






VAHA Change Management Process



Why Westinghouse Electric Company chose DOORS



The Importance of a Requirements Management Program to Westinghouse

- Customers expect their contractual requirements to be met by our products and services
- Nuclear regulatory requirements must be met by our design
- Standards & certifications must be in compliance
- Our products/services must meet these requirements before we can be paid
- “Change” happens – we use DOORS functionality to manage the change for us

DOORS connects requirements to test cases and test results

DOORS provides the ability to hold online document review process




*If you don't know
where you are
going....
how will you
know
when you get
there?*



Westinghouse's collaborative example

- Collaborating among ecosystem partners for new-build design work




US Department of Energy (DOE) - Yucca Mountain Repository

Develop a national site for spent nuclear fuel & high-level **radioactive waste** storage.

Project lead by a consortium of government contractors, URS Corporation, Shaw Corporation and Areva Federal Services LLC.

The program used **Rational's DOORS** product to develop an extensive requirements database to track and manage an extremely broad range of program and regulatory requirements ranging from US CFRs to Contract Requirements.



Requirements in ~20 areas managed with DOORS

| Object ID | Object Name | Object Type | Applicability | Implement | Comments |
|------------------------------|---|-------------|----------------|-----------|---|
| AP-EP-001 | Lead Lab Emergency Operations | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | Responsibility for coordination falls under Business Operations. Currently LL staff have roles/responsibilities in the event of an emergency. |
| EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | LL developed ESH-PLN-001 and ESH-PRG-001 and supporting desktops. These are located on SharePoint under Emergency Response. |
| EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | Responsibility for coordination falls under Business Operations. |
| EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | Limited Applicability. |
| EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | 2.0 Note - Lead Lab reports incident to OCRWM Science Division |
| EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | SNL on pg 3 - maintains docs to implement this Plan. Implementing or "in lieu of" Mechanism- ESH-DSK-001 ESH-DSK-002 ESH-DSK-003 ESH-DSK-004 ESH-DSK-005 ESH-PLN-001 ESH-PRG-001. |
| 10CFR851 | Worker Safety and Health Program (DOE) | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | Implemented via SNL's NNSA-approved WSHP (851) program (Doc PG470216) |
| CPR400.1.1.41 | Safety Basis Manual | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | Compilation of all former individual ES&H Safety Manual Sections, supplements, and Safety Basis Level 3 documents. |
| OCS-JRD-0432 | Guidance Letter - OCS-JRD-0432 - Ranch Control Operation and Guidance/Response letters for Worker Safety and Health Program Plan (WSHPP) - 10 CFR 851 | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | RMRT-0049 |
| ISS100.4.1 | Control Access by Foreign Nationals to Unclassified DOE Information, Programs, and Technologies, and SNL Sites | Requirement | Applicable Now | Yes | RMRT-0054 Formerly CPR400.3.5, Foreign Interactions |

Emergency Mgt.

Safety and Health

Safeguards & Security



Summary

The challenges facing the nuclear community continue to rise

The introduction of software-based I&C is one of the key drivers

There is a need for more effective collaboration and
synchronization amongst all parties in the ecosystem

Better collaboration is achievable through the use of existing
integrated, scalable, and battle-tested IT platforms

